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Abstract 
  This study investigates the value-relevance corporate governance 
disclosures published in the narrative part of annual reports of ten banks listed 
at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) over the entire period from year 
2010 to year 2015. This work extends the line of research on value relevance 
by quantifying narrative accounting, in this case corporate governance 
disclosures using content analysis. In addition, in line with prior studies, this 
study employs the Ohlson´s (1995) value-relevance model and finds that 
corporate governance disclosure is significantly positively related to market 
value, measured by the average market price per share. The findings reveal 
that corporate governance disclosures influence investors’ perceptions and are 
therefore, vital to be included in annual reports, which are a major 
communication tool. 
 
Keywords: Value Relevance, Market Price Per Share, Corporate Governance 
Disclosure, Non-Financial Disclosure 
 
Introduction 
Accounting information in a firm’s annual reports shows the firm’s 
economic status. Weygandt, Kieso and Kimmel (2003) observe that 
accounting information can be financial or non-financial. IASB (2011) defines 
financial information as information about a reporting entity's financial 
condition included in the IAS 1 description of financial statements. Non-
financial information is any information that does not have to be included in 
the IAS 1 description of financial statements (Ronnie, 2009). Non-financial 
information may not be expressed in numbers or financial figures and it can 
have financial-statement relation or not (Thomas, Céline & Ludwig, 2014). 
Traditionally, firms’ annual reports mainly included financial 
statements and financial information has always been one of the key building 
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blocks of a firm's reporting (O’Regan, 2008). However, players in accounting 
have increasingly expressed concerns regarding the content of traditional 
accounting reporting (Amir & Lev, 1996). Today, firms more and more rely 
not just on their resources but also on the resources belonging to the society. 
Therefore, the value creation process is based on the principle of shared costs. 
The value created by an organization therefore needs to be shared between its 
owners and society. Quality reporting by firms is therefore progressively vital 
for strong and sustainable organizations, financial markets, and economies 
(Stewart, 2015).  
Regulators and standard setters are seen as an appropriate solution to 
solve these problems, pushing firms to disclose their private information 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Governance code exists to maintain good 
governance. That is, to ensure that the firm is governed in accordance to the 
idea of the shareholders. The codes are largely not mandatory for listed firms 
(Kollegiet, 2010). In their work, Aguilera and Alvaro (2009) note that most 
codes have some recommendations on six governance issues: a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors, such as independent nonexecutive 
directors; a clear division of responsibilities between the chairman and the 
chief executive officer; the need for timely and quality information provided 
to the board; formal and transparent procedures for the appointment of new 
directors; balanced and understandable financial reporting; and the 
maintenance of a sound and efficient system of internal control. The 
international corporate governance network (ICGN), established in 1995 to 
develop a global corporate governance practices and to facilitate international 
dialogue on corporate governance issues, contend that it is in the public 
interest to encourage and enable the owners of corporations to participate in 
the governance of those of corporations. 
Bushman and Smith (2003) point out that corporate governance 
disclosure is one of the useful tools in assessing the credibility of financial 
information, as well as in accurately setting expectation and reducing 
uncertainty concerning the firm’s performance. Bushman, Piotroski and Smith 
(2004) observe that such disclosure also reveals on whom the responsibility 
for governing the firm rest, the compensation structure and how and where 
they invest financial resources. According to ACCA (2009), should the 
governance mechanisms not be disclosed, the firm’s stakeholders may not be 
able to access such information. Klein, Shapiro, and Young (2005) observe 
that the Board of Directors (BOD) disclosure is viewed as one of the important 
element corporate governance disclosure. This includes the size of board and 
its independence. Among the pros of corporate governance disclosure are 
gained legitimacy, reduced information asymmetry and reduced capital cost 
(Healy & Palepu 2001). Larsson (2009) note that in order to be value relevant, 
it is imperative that the disclosures are credible.  
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IIRC (2013c) points out the information needed by stakeholders to 
make informed decisions. Consequently, disclosures on governance structure 
affect the reader’s view of the credibility of the entire set of disclosures, 
because it reflects the confidence of the firm’s ability to create value through 
the business model, be transparent and disclose accurate information. 
In Kenya, the Capital Markets Act (Cap. 485A) empowers the Capital 
Markets Authority (CMA) to issue the guidelines on corporate governance. 
The guidelines issued by CMA were developed in reference to approaches by 
various jurisdictions across the world. CMA has also facilitated the Private 
Sector Corporate Governance Trust in Kenya in the development and issuance 
of the code of best practice for corporate governance in Kenya. The guidelines 
recognize the role of good governance in corporate performance. CMA 
expects listed firms to adopt, nurture, and encourage the progression of 
practices into best practices; it also expects the directors to comply with 
minimum requirements. Specifically, every listed company is required to 
disclose, on annual basis, in its annual report, a statement of the directors 
stating whether the firm is adhering to the corporate guidelines (Ruparelia & 
Njuguna, 2016).  
The term ‘value relevance’ points at the relationship between a 
security’s price and a set of corporate report variables (Balachandran & 
Mohanram, 2010). The term is said to have been used first by Amir et al. 
(1993) even though the literature on the value relevance concept dates back to 
the nineteen sixties with early contributions by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Beaver and Dukes (1972). Scott (2003) holds that accounting information is 
value relevant if it leads investors to revise their beliefs and actions. For a 
disclosure to be relevant, it must among others, be quick to respond to users’ 
(particularly the investors) needs. 
 
Literature Review 
A number of corporate scandals and corporate governance failures in 
the 1990/2000s occasioned by fraud and insufficient systems of control raised 
the question on the credibility of corporations and particularly the governance. 
While regulators and standard setters have increased the push on firms in 
regard to governance disclosure as a way remedying this phenomenon, 
researcher have carried out studies on the ability of corporate governance 
disclosure to explain or capture information that affects the value of a firm , 
as measured by the market value of the disclosing firm (Tariq & Abbas 2013). 
In a study on corporate governance and the quality of financial analysts' 
information, Byard, Li and Weintrop (2006) found out that the quality of 
financial analysts' information about upcoming earnings increases with the 
quality of corporate governance and concluded that governance quality is 
positively correlated with the quality of analyst forecasts. This was seen to 
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imply that firms with high governance quality produce more reliable and 
transparent information. In line with this, McKinsey (2002) observes that 
according to the Global Investor Opinion Survey, more than 50% of Western 
European and North American investors look at governance disclosure as 
being more, or equally, essential as financial issues, that is, profit, performance 
and growth potential. In a study on the factors influencing corporate 
governance disclosures, Mallin and Ow-Yong (2012) conclude that in the rest 
of the world the number is over 80 %. 
Mingzhu and Khaled (2013) examined the impact of corporate governance on 
the level of voluntary disclosures of forward-looking statements in the 
narrative sections of annual reports and whether such statements impact on 
future earnings. The study focused on large-scale sample of UK (Financial 
Times Stock Exchange) FTSE All-Share companies for financial years ending 
within the period January 1996 to December 2007. The study concluded that 
better corporate governance improves reporting practice and that the forward-
looking statements of well governed firms improve the stock market’s ability 
to anticipate future earnings. This implies that corporate governance 
disclosures are value relevant. 
Ahsan and Istiaq (2008) studied corporate governance and the value‐
relevance of accounting information in Australia. The study used board, audit 
committee and external audit related variables as a proxy for corporate 
governance. Value‐relevance was measured by the adjusted R2 derived from 
a regression of stock price on earnings and equity book values following 
Ohlosn's accounting‐based valuation framework. The results showed that 
firms with strong governance structure exhibit higher value‐relevance of 
accounting information. The results further showed that firm‐specific 
economic variables are important determinants of the value‐relevance of 
accounting information. 
In a study “Do the Characteristics of the Board of Directors Affect the 
Value Relevance of Accounting Information?” Mishari, Faisal and Khalid 
(2015), based on a hypothesis that the characteristics of the board of directors 
that influence the value relevance of accounting information may be different 
in developed and less-developed countries, explored the issue in a less-
developed country, Kuwait. Using regressions based on Ohlson's (1995) 
valuation model, the findings revealed that the structure of board had a 
significant positive relationship with the value relevance of accounting 
information. In particular, board size and role duality are significantly 
associated with firm’s market value. The results also showed that accounting 
reports of firms with a smaller board, where the roles of CEO and chairman of 
the board are split had higher impact on firm’s market value. Cross 
directorships had a positive, though insignificant, relationship with firm’s 
value. The findings were interpreted to mean that the theoretical prediction 
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that the characteristics of the board of directors influence market valuation was 
correct, and therefore this information is value relevant. 
Collins, Kwaku and Jo (2011) examined the relative value relevance 
of shareholder versus stakeholder corporate governance disclosure in South 
Africa using a sample of 169 listed firms from year 2002 to year 2007, and 
established that disclosing good corporate governance practices on both 
shareholders and stakeholders impacts positively on firm value. 
Hussain and Hussain (2012) carried out a research on board of 
directors’ characteristics disclosures and value relevance of accounting 
information in Malaysia in which they used the panel data approach for 270 
Malaysian Shariah - compliant companies over the period of three years 
covering 2007 to 2009. The study examined the relationship between some 
boards of directors’ characteristics namely the board of directors’ size, number 
of independent non-executive directors in the board, the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) duality and the number of Muslim directors in the board. Some 
firm’s unique attributes, namely, firm’s size, leverage, profitability and size of 
audit firm were regressed in the model as control variables.  
Three panel data estimations, that is, Pooled OLS, Fixed and Random 
effects models were carried out using the Ohlson’s (1995) model to study these 
relationships. The results revealed that the board size does not affect the value 
relevance of accounting information, since of the two had a negative non- 
significant relationship. In addition, the findings showed that there is a positive 
but non - significant relationship between the board independency and value 
relevance of accounting information. The study also concluded that splitting 
the roles of CEO from that of the board chairman does not increase value 
relevance of accounting information. The result also revealed that availability 
of Muslims in board of director did not strongly influence the value relevance 
of accounting information. The study interpreted these findings to mean that 
corporate governance disclosure does not affect the value relevance of 
accounting information. 
Catherine (2008) carried out a study on the value-relevance of 
corporate governance in Australia. The study hypothesized that corporate 
governance disclosure enhances the value relevance of accounting reporting, 
that is, it increases the reliance by market on this information to value the firm. 
The findings revealed that corporate governance disclosure is not value-
relevant in its own right. 
In a study on corporate performance, board structure and their 
determinants in the banking industry in USA, Adams and Mehran (2008) 
concluded that there are no benefits for having non-executive director 
dominance on corporate boards. This conclusion concurs with an earlier 
related study by Belkhir (2006) who studied board structure, ownership 
structure, and firm performance in the banking industry in the US. Belkhir 
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(2006) noted that board composition has no bearing whatsoever on wealth 
maximisation. This implies that a haphazard selection of executive and non-
executive board members is of no consequence in the quest for value creation. 
Some empirical evidence on corporate governance disclosure and the value of 
firms indicate a positive relationship between the two. However, findings are 
not consistent across studies. While some indicate a higher value relevance of 
disclosures for firms with strong governance structures (for example 
McKinsey, 2002; Mishari, Faisal & Khalid 2015), some studies do not agree 
with these findings (for example Adams & Mehran, 2008; Belkhir, 2006; 
Catherine 2008; Hussain & Hussain 2012). The alternative hypothesis for this 
study states that corporate governance disclosure in the annual reports of listed 
banks in Kenya is value relevant. 
 
Research Methodology 
This section introduces the econometric estimations model used in this 
study. Data covering a period of 6 years (from 2010 to 2015) for 10 banks 
listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange over the entire period was collected. 
The average annual market price per share was used as a proxy for value 
relevance while content analysis was used to derive a quantitative measure of 
relevance for each corporate governance disclosure. According to Flöstrand 
and Ström (2006), while financial disclosures are quantitative in nature, non-
financial disclosures, like the corporate governance disclosure, are qualitative, 
in text form, and they relate to future expectations and their related effects on 
creation of value. Consequently, non-financial disclosures are not only hard to 
identify and standardize, but also to measure or quantify. This fact informed 
the use of content analysis to derive a quality indicative index. 
 
Content Analysis Process and its Rationale  
Content analysis is defined as any methodological measurement 
applied to text (or other symbolic materials) for social science purpose (Duriau 
et al., 2007). Content analysis has been widely applied in accounting research 
to reveal useful insights into the general mood of disclosures and to quantify 
the sentiment on various subjects. It is an established approach for gathering 
data from annual reports (Abeysekera & Guthrie, 2005; Alves, 2011; 
Steenkamp & Northcott, 2007). 
Leitoniene and Sapkauskiene (2015), observe that content analysis 
application on qualitative data can be categorized into two main groups: (a) 
based on volume, that is, textual analysis (thematic content analysis, that is, 
the study of clarity and linguistic analysis) and, (b) based on quality, that is, 
calculation of disclosure index (often presented as evaluation of quality of 
disclosure). Approaches based on volume do not take into account quality or 
meaning of the content of a disclosure, but they just focus on the quantity of 
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information in a disclosure, for example, the number of pages, sentences or 
words, phrases, lines and so on. The limitation is that a disclosure can include 
content that are not of relevance to the subject matter (Chiu & Wang, 2015). 
On the other hand, approaches that are based on the quality aim at 
evaluating the quality of information in a disclosure using a quality indicative 
index. Disclosure quality index can be defined as an instrument that is 
designed to measure a number of indicators, in which when the indicators are 
summed up to reveal the level of specific information disclosed. The quality 
indicative index is a practical and research-based tool and it is applied on the 
basis of guidelines or other indicators that are presented in the disclosure. The 
researcher need to first employ a coding system. Although this approach can 
be subjective, it is much more comprehensive and allows a better assessment 
of the object under investigation, because it takes into account more 
parameters (Hooks & Staden, 2011).  
The approach used in this study, focused on evaluating the quality of 
information in corporate governance disclosures. It involved three broad 
stages: (a) determining the words contained in each of the sample disclosures 
and their frequency of occurrence (b) generation of relevant words which are 
related to corporate governance disclosures using a dictionary-based tool (c) 
determining the aggregate frequency of occurrence of relevant words, which 
is a quantitative indicator of the quality and level of relevance of a disclosure. 
 
Determining the Words Contained in Sample Disclosures and Their 
Frequency of Occurrence 
First a total of sixty electronic copies of annual reports (one copy each 
year, for six years, by ten banks) released by the ten banks covered in this 
study for the years 2010 to 2015 were uploaded into content analysis 
specialized software tool Atlas.ti, version 8. Second, the corporate governance 
disclosure in each report was coded resulting into sixty data codes. Third, a 
list of all the words contained in every data code and their frequency of 
occurrence was generated in the form of an Ms excel output. 
 
Generation of Relevant Words Related to Corporate Governance 
Disclosure 
In his work “Basis content analysis”, Weber (1990) details the 
application of dictionaries in carrying out content analysis. Dictionaries are 
previously generated word lists to a certain topic that pre-define the words that 
will be counted in the content analysis (Vourvachis & Woodward, 2015). 
According to Short et al. (2010) most of content analysis studies use 
dictionary-based tools that may have standard dictionaries already 
implemented or at least allow their generation. Harvard dictionary was used 
in this study. 
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Harvard dictionary is a famous and frequently used standard 
dictionary, and it can be used for examining tone and sentiment in corporate 
disclosure. It is a computer based program that can be used to find words that 
match a given set of constraints and that should be used in a given context. A 
wide variety of constraints on meaning, spelling, sound, and vocabulary can 
be specified in any combination permitting a list of words and phrases relating 
to a given concept to be generated (Marie-Claude & Cormier 2014). 
This study used a disclosure index developed by Robb et al. (2001), in 
a study “Nonfinancial disclosures across Anglo-American countries”, to 
generate words from the dictionary. The Robb et al. index is based on the work 
of the AICPA (The Jenkins report). Relevant words were generated for the 
following five areas of corporate governance disclosure. 
Table 1: Index of Quality of Corporate Governance Disclosure 
Index of quality of corporate governance disclosure 
 Identity and background of directors and management 
 Management activities – meetings and attendances 
 The major segments by which management operates the company 
 Identity of major shareholders, all shares owned, and by directors, management, and employees 
 Division of responsibilities between the chairman and the chief executive officer 
 
Determining the Aggregate Frequency of Relevant Words  
  Providing information on a specific topic entails the use of related 
words more often (see Elo & Kyngäs, 2007; Rolfe, 2006; Thomas et al., 
2014). According to Pennebaker et al. (2003) the words used can transport 
information, despite of their semantic context. The authors further contend 
that while verbal language is greatly influenced by non-verbal 
communication, information that is transmitted in written language is more 
primarily dependent on the actual word.  
  Pennebaker et al. (2003), points out that the resulting structure of 
words, allows a researcher to evaluate different data sources based on their 
content. On this basis, observation of a distinct group of words in a 
disclosure can be taken as an indicator of the provision of specific 
information. Building on this perspective, and in line with prior research 
that has identified word frequency as a sign for cognitive centrality (see 
Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Bailey, 2008; Bengtsson, 2016; Duriau et 
al., 2007) the aggregate frequency of occurrence of the relevant words (in 
this study, words used in corporate governance disclosures in annual 
reports of listed banks, as they appear in the list of the dictionary generated 
relevant words for corporate governance disclosure) was then taken as a 
qualitative indicator of the level of relevance for each disclosure.  
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The general empirical model used in this study was defined as follows: 
MVi = β0 + β1Xi + ε  
 
Where:  
MV = Market Value of Equity 
X = Corporate governance disclosure 
β1 = the coefficient of Xi for i = 0, 1…  
ε = Random "error" assumed to have a N (0, 2) distribution 
 
Results and Discussion 
Both descriptive and inferential analyses were carried out in this study. 
The results presentation and discussion are presented here. 
 
Descriptive Analysis of Data 
Table 2 presents the summaries of the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in this study.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables 
    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Corporate 
governance 
disclosure Mean 111.20 
116.9
0 119.60 116.60 119.10 
233.1
0 
 
Std. 
Deviation 17.34 15.56 19.41 13.24 17.93 29.98 
 Minimum 21.00 36.00 16.00 49.00 46.00 88.00 
 Maximum 193.00 
187.0
0 208.00 173.00 214.00 
380.0
0 
Average MPS Mean 52.89 51.20 77.08 96.51 77.72 57.68 
 
Std. 
Deviation 18.97 20.20 28.94 33.51 26.76 21.02 
 Minimum 14.81 12.48 16.87 16.80 14.07 7.89 
  Maximum 204.58 
213.8
3 298.45 326.85 251.48 
198.8
8 
 
In general, the mean for corporate governance disclosure is seen to 
assume an upward trend. This means that the quality of the disclosure 
generally improved over the study period. Topazio (2013) observe that there 
has been a growing importance of financial markets in recent decades which 
has led to a continuous increase in the demand by the investment community 
for more comprehensive and timely information to be reported by companies 
which, according to Stewart (2015) have forced organizations to react to 
stakeholders’ demands and the significance of inclusion of non-financial 
disclosure have increased cumulatively. The findings reflect the results of a 
study by Ocean (2015) which concluded that narrative accounting represented 
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84% of total value market value which represented a growth of 52% from 
1985.  
The results also revealed a significant variation in the quality of the 
disclosure from year to year and from company to company over the period 
under study. The disclosure had a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 380. 
This reflects the observation by Cascino et al. (2013) that the advancement 
regarding integrated reporting is an ongoing process and that much of this is 
unregulated and therefore preparers are free to express themselves. This 
invites impression management occasioning the potential for readers to be 
treated to particular interpretations and ways of thinking. The agency theory 
is founded on the idea of maximization of individual advantage, it thus pre-
supposes that the principal and agent are opportunistic and steadily seek out 
their own self-interest and preferences. 
 
Inferential Statistics Results 
 The null hypothesis tested in order to validate data analysis was that 
corporate social responsibility disclosure in the annual reports of listed banks 
in Kenya has no value relevance. This section present results of the correlation 
and regression analysis. Before proceeding with the analysis several 
diagnostic tests were carried out to test how well the data fitted in the model. 
The results are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3:Diagnostic Tests Results 
Diagnostic tests Test used Criterion Conclusion 
Reliability Test 
Results 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
0.70 or 
above 
Acceptable reliability coefficient of 0.7 
Factor Analysis 
Factors 
loadings 
0.40 or 
above 
The variables had a factor loadings above 40% 
Normality Test K-S test p>0.05 Data for the variables was normally distributed 
Multicollinearity VIF VIF< 10.0  No threat of multicollinearity  
Hausman Test for 
Model Specification 
Hausman Test p>0.05 
chi2 = 0.8675; Null hypothesis that a random 
effect model is the best was not rejected 
Homoscedastic Test  
Breusch and  
Pagan (1979)  
p>0.05  
Null hypothesis was accepted and concluded that 
there was homoscedasticity  
Stationarity ADF   p>0.05 
The variables become stationary at first 
differencing (unit root disappeared on first 
differencing) The null hypothesis that there is a 
unit root was subsequently rejected  
 
Correlation Results 
 This section contains results of correlation tests conducted to test the 
association between of corporate governance disclosure and the average MPS. 
 
 
 
European Scientific Journal December 2019 edition Vol.15, No.34 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
283 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Correlations 
Corporate governance 
disclosure 
Corporate governance 
disclosure Pearson Correlation 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 
   
Average MPS Pearson Correlation 0.441 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 
 N 60 
 
 The results showed that corporate governance disclosure had a 
correlation value r= 0.441 and p-value = 0.001. The finding revealed a strong 
positive association between corporate governance disclosure and average 
market price per share. This finding implies that positive change in corporate 
governance disclosure could bring about a positive response in average market 
price per share hence the value relevance of annual reports. Bushman and 
Smith (2003), Healy and Palepu (2001) and Larsson (2009) also pointed out 
that corporate governance disclosure is one of the useful tools in assessing the 
credibility of financial information, as well as in accurately setting expectation 
and reducing uncertainty concerning the firm’s performance. 
 
Regression Analysis Results  
 Regression analysis was carried out to test the effect of corporate 
governance disclosure on the average MPS. The Hausman test for model 
specification showed a prob>chi2 value of 0.8675 which is greater than the 
critical p - value at 5% level of significance. This implies that the null 
hypothesis that a random effect model is the best was not rejected. The study 
used random effect regression model to test the relationship between corporate 
governance disclosure and the average MPS. The findings are presented in 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Corporate Governance Disclosure and Average MPS 
Average MPS Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Corporate Governance Disclosure 0.36921 0.154482 2.39 0.004 
constant 50.17978 27.35442 1.83 0.067 
     
Wald chi2 (1) = 1.94    
Prob > chi2 =0.1640    
R-squared = 0.0155    
 
 The findings revealed a Wald chi2 = 1.94 and Prob > chi2=0.0155. This 
imply that the model average MPS = 50.17978+ 0.36921 (Corporate 
Governance Disclosure) + ε was statistically significant. The findings further 
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revealed that R-squared = 0.0155, meaning that 1.55% of the variation in the 
average MPS was accounted for by corporate governance disclosure. The 
results of the beta coefficient of the resulting model showed that the constant 
α = 50.17978 was significantly different from 0, since the p - value of 0.067 
was greater than 0.05. The coefficient β = 0.36921 was also significantly 
different from 0 with a p-value of 0.004 which was less than 0.05. The results 
imply that a unit change in corporate governance disclosure will bring about 
0.36921 units change in average market price per share. This confirms that 
there is a significant positive relationship between corporate governance 
disclosure and average market price per share for the listed bank in Kenya. 
 The finding agrees with those of (Bushman & Smith, 2003; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Larsson, 2009) who also pointed out that corporate governance 
disclosure is one of the useful tools in assessing the credibility of financial 
information, as well as in accurately setting expectation and reducing 
uncertainty concerning the firm’s performance. The findings further 
correspond with a report by IIRC (2013c). The report pointed out the 
information needed by stakeholders to make informed decisions and 
concluded that disclosures on governance structure affect the reader’s view of 
the credibility of the entire set of disclosures, because it reflects the confidence 
of the firm’s ability to create value through the business model, be transparent 
and disclose accurate information.  
 
Summary of Findings 
 The descriptive results showed that a change in corporate 
governance disclosure resulted in a similar change the market price per 
share. The correlation test findings indicated a strong positive association 
between corporate governance disclosure and average market price of 
shares. These results implied that positive change in corporate governance 
disclosure in annual reports could lead to a positive change in average 
market price per share. Regression analysis result revealed that there is a 
significant positive relationship between corporate governance disclosure 
in annual reports of the listed bank in Kenya and the average MPS. The 
findings showed that the corporate governance disclosure in annual reports 
of the listed bank in Kenya is value relevant. 
 
Conclusion 
The study further found out that corporate governance disclosure in 
annual reports of listed banks in Kenya is value relevant and therefore 
concluded that corporate governance disclosure is essential for decisions 
on investment in the share of listed banks in Kenya. In this case corporate 
governance disclosure will enhance the public confidence in investing in 
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the organization. Therefore it is important for listed firms to disclose 
relevant information regarding the corporate governance. 
 
Recommendations 
The study observed significant explanatory power of corporate 
governance disclosure on the average MPS. In extension, this means that 
narrative accounting is important for decisions on investment in shares of 
firm. The study therefore recommends an expanded role of the auditor in 
reviewing and reporting non-financial disclosures. Currently in accounting 
reporting, under ISA 720 (the auditor's responsibilities relating to other 
information in documents containing audited financial statements), the 
auditor is not obligated to formally audit and report on non-financial 
disclosures. Instead, an auditor reviews the accounting narratives to 
ascertain if the narratives are consistent with the financial statements. The 
study further recommends more guidelines and regulations in relation to 
non-financial disclosures to ensure that firms put clearer and relevant 
information in the hand of investors. 
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